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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent decades a large number of new sovereign states has been created
through secessions, decolonization and breakup of existing countries. Since 1990
the Soviet Union split into ﬁfteen independent countries, Yugoslavia gave way
to six sovereign states (not counting Kosovo), Czechoslovakia broke into two
separate states, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia, Namibia gained independence
from South Africa, and Timor Leste left Indonesia. Today there are 193 interna-
tionally recognized sovereign states in the world, up from 74 in 1945 (the latest
UN member is Montenegro, which joined in 2006). At the same time numer-
ous countries, while remaining uniﬁed, have taken steps towards more regional
autonomy and decentralization.1 Regional redistribution, decentralization and
federalism have played a prominent role in political debates across Europe (e.g.,
in Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) and all over the world - from
Canada to Colombia, from Nigeria to South Africa, from Iraq to India.
These trends have motivated a growing literature on the political economy
of national borders, which has addressed questions such as: Why do countries
break up? What are the costs and beneﬁts of secessions and border redrawing?
1Are country breakups eﬃcient from an economic perspective? Is the demand
for sovereignty and independence connected to the demand for regional decen-
tralization and autonomy within uniﬁed countries? Do decentralization and
federalism reduce the periphery’s incentives to secede?
In this chapter we will review some key concepts and results about the eﬃ-
ciency and stability of national borders from an economic perspective (Section
2). Building on those ideas, we will then discuss two related questions:
(i) We will consider the relationship between interregional redistribution and
the stability of national borders, and argue that interregional redistribution
is a two-sided sword, depending on whether transfers are based on regional
preferences or income (Section 3).
(ii) We will ask whether decentralization and federalism promote or hamper
country stability (Section 4). In particular, we will provide a simple analytical
model of the relationship between decentralization and incentives to secede, and
brieﬂy discuss some empirical evidence.
2 The political economy of national borders: an
overview
The formation and breakup of sovereign states has been at the center of a vast
philosophical, political, and historical literature for centuries.2. In contrast,
economists have usually taken political borders as given. Only in recent years
2has the literature started to address questions of country formation and breakup
with the tools and concepts of economic analysis. This is an appropriate de-
velopment, because political borders are not a ﬁxed part of the geographical
landscape, to be treated as given ("exogenous"), but human-made institutions,
aﬀected by the decisions and interactions of individuals and groups pursuing
their objectives under constraints. Therefore, understanding the formation and
breakup of nations is a natural extension of political economics. The central
goal of contemporary political economy is to understand ("endogenize") col-
lective decisions and institutions, and such institutions include sovereign states
and federations. General discussions of the economic literature on national bor-
ders are provided in Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Bolton, Roland and Spolaore
(1996), and Spolaore (2006), on which this section mainly builds. Contributions
to the economic literature on national borders and secessions include Alesina
and Spolaore (1997, 2005, 2006), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), Bolton
and Roland (1997), Bordignon and Brusco (2001), Ellingsen (1998), Goyal and
Staal (2003), Le Breton and Weber (2003), Wittman (2000), and others.
When we consider the number and size of sovereign states from an eco-
nomic perspective, a natural starting point is the trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts
and costs from a larger size. An essential role for states is the supply of pub-
lic goods to their citizens. Providing public goods comes with economies of
scale, because public goods are typically non-rival in consumption. That is,
each citizen can beneﬁt from them without reducing the beneﬁts for other cit-
izens, and therefore public goods are cheaper per person when more taxpayers
3pay for them. Empirically, the share of government spending over gross do-
mestic product (GDP) is decreasing in population: smaller countries tend to
have proportionally larger governments.3 Moreover, in principle larger nations
can better internalize cross-regional externalities - an issue extensively studied in
the literature on decentralization and ﬁscal federalism. Additional beneﬁts from
size come from insurance against imperfectly correlated natural and economic
shocks through interregional transfers, when economic agents cannot perfectly
insure against those shocks in international capital markets.
However, a larger size also comes with signiﬁcant economic and political
costs. As states become larger, administrative costs and congestion may over-
come some of the scale beneﬁts. More importantly, an expansion of a state’s
borders is likely to bring about higher diversity of preferences for public policies
and types of governments across diﬀerent groups of citizens. As national borders
include more diverse populations - with diﬀerent cultures, languages, ethnici-
ties, religions, and so on - disagreements over the fundamental characteristics
of the state (e.g., legal system, oﬃcial language, foreign policy) become more
likely to emerge and harder to reconcile. In general, being part of the same
country implies sharing jointly-supplied public goods and policies in ways that
cannot always satisfy everybody’s preferences. This induces a trade-oﬀ between
economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences. Such trade-oﬀ has played
a central role in the economic literature on the size of nations (see Alesina and
Spolaore, 1997; 2003).
The trade-oﬀ depends not only on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences
4but also on the political regime through which preferences are turned into poli-
cies. For example, rent-seeking dictators (Leviathans) that are less concerned
with the preferences of their subjects may pursue expansionary policies leading
to the formation of ineﬃciently large countries and empires. In contrast, democ-
ratization leads to secessions and formation of smaller countries. Up to a point,
the breakup of countries associated with democratization can improve eﬃciency.
However, in the absence of eﬀective political mechanisms to integrate popula-
tions with diverse preferences, self-determination and voting outcomes tend to
bring about excessive fragmentation and costly breakup. Such political costs
tend to depend not only on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences, but also
on the quality of institutions through which individual preferences are turned
into collective action. While in some societies and political systems there exist
eﬀective mechanisms to integrate populations with diverse preferences, in other
societies heterogeneity comes with higher political and economic costs. On the
other hand, the quality of institutions itself is likely to depend on the extent
preferences are heterogenous within a society. At the same time, diversity may
also bring about some direct economic beneﬁts through learning, specialization
and exchange of ideas and innovations. Successful societies manage to mini-
mize the costs of heterogeneity while maximizing the beneﬁts stemming from a
diverse pool of preferences, skills and endowments.
The study of the relationship among heterogeneity of preferences, quality of
institutions and stability of countries is still in its infancy. A diﬃcult task is
how to measure relevant heterogeneity of preferences and characteristics across
5individuals and regions. Valuable information is provided by measures of eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization (introduced in the economic literature by Mauro,
1995), but such variables proxy only imperfectly for the extent and intensity
of preference heterogeneity that aﬀect the determination of national borders.
More recent economic contributions have considered direct measures of long-
term historical diﬀerences across populations, including measures of genetic,
linguistic and religious distance that explain the diﬀusion of technological and
institutional innovations across societies (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). An
interesting analysis that connects genetic, linguistic and cultural distances to
national stability in Europe is provided by Desmet et al. (2007).
As stressed by the economic literature on national borders, the trade-oﬀ be-
tween beneﬁts and costs of size is not invariant with respect to the political
and economic environment. For instance, it is also a function of the degree
of international openness (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2000; 2004; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2005). This is because interna-
tional openness aﬀects the economic impact of a country’s domestic size. The
extent of the market is an important determinant of economic prosperity, but
the size of the market does not necessarily coincide with the political size of a
country as deﬁned by its national borders. Larger nations mean larger markets
when political borders imply barriers to international exchange. In contrast,
market size and political size would be uncorrelated in a world of perfect free
trade in which political borders imposed no costs on international exchanges.
Consequently, market size depends both on country size and the degree of in-
6ternational openness. Small countries can prosper in a world of free trade and
high economic integration, whereas a large political size is more important for
economic success in a world of trade barriers and protectionism. This is con-
ﬁrmed by empirical evidence from cross-country regressions. The eﬀect of size on
economic performance (income per capita, growth) tends to be higher for coun-
tries that are less open, and the eﬀect of openness is much larger for smaller
countries4 This has important consequences for the stability of countries. As
international economic integration increases, the beneﬁts of a large political size
are reduced, and the formation of smaller political units (political disintegration)
becomes less costly. Hence the trade-oﬀ between size and heterogeneity shifts
in favor of smaller and more homogeneous countries. We can also think of the
reverse source of causality. Small countries have a particularly strong interest
in maintaining free trade, since so much of their economy depends upon inter-
national markets. When openness is endogenized, the analysis can be extended
to capture two possible worlds: a world of large and relatively closed economies,
and one of more numerous, smaller, more open economies (Spolaore, 2004).In
a nutshell, economic integration and political disintegration tend to go hand in
hand.
Another prominent set of forces aﬀecting national borders and their stability
stems from from conﬂict, defense and security. Contributions to the economic
literature on endogenous borders have explicitly modeled provision of defense,
international conﬂicts and wars, building on the formal literature on conﬂict
and appropriation pioneered by Haavelmo (1954), Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer
7(1989, 1991) and Grossman (1991). For instance, international conﬂict and
defense are at the center of the analysis of country formation and breakup in
Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) and Spolaore (2004). In those papers the
size of nations is aﬀected by the fact that a country’s military power matters
in the settlement of international disputes. Defense and national power are
public goods, and, in principle, larger countries can provide better and cheaper
security for their citizens. In a more bellicose world, larger, more centralized
countries may be at an advantage, whereas a reduction in international conﬂict
reduces the incentives to form larger political unions. However, a decrease in the
importance of military force may not reduce the total number of violent conﬂicts
in the world. When borders are formed endogenously, a lower role for defense
and security, by bringing about the formation of more numerous countries, may
paradoxically increase the number of observed conﬂicts in the world, because,
even if the use of force is less likely in each speciﬁc international dispute, the
higher number of countries raises the probability that some of those countries
may enter into a military confrontation. For example, Alesina and Spolaore
(2006) show that a lower probability of having to use force in international
relations increases the number of nations in equilibrium, and can lead to an
increase in the number of international interactions that are resolved by force. In
sum, a reduction in global conﬂict between larger political units may lead to an
increase in more localized conﬂict between smaller political units. Analogously,
improvements in the enforcement of national "control rights" through a more
eﬀective rule of international law will reduce the need for defense and force, and
8may therefore cause breakups of nations, possibly leading to more rather than
less conﬂicts in equilibrium (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005). In more recent work,
Spolaore (2008) has provided a formal analysis of endogenous border formation
when secessions are the direct outcome of civil conﬂict between two regions
within a uniﬁed country. In that context, total spending on civil-conﬂict inputs
and the probability of secession are endogenous variables, which depend on the
incentives to secede and on the incentives to oppose a secession. Such incentives
depend on heterogeneity costs (associated with diﬀerent preferences over the
type of government), economies of scale in the provision of public goods, and
the relative size of the two regions. In particular, separatist conﬂict tends to
be more intense when the two regions are of roughly equal size, consistently
with the empirical literature on civil and ethnic conﬂict (see Horowitz (1985)
and,Collier (2001)). As we have seen, a special case of economies of scale from
a larger size stems from the provision of defense and security against external
threats. Interestingly, external threats do not necessarily reduce the intensity of
separatist conﬂict within a country, because, while they reduce the incentives to
secede in the smaller region, they also increase the larger region’s incentives to
resist the smaller region’s secession, and may therefore lead to more diversion
of resources towards civil conﬂict in the aggregate. Finally, the possibility that
civil conﬂict about government policies may occur also after borders have been
determined reduces both the incentives to secede in the smaller region and the
beneﬁts from union in the larger region. In fact, as also shown in Spolaore
(2008), it is even possible that the perspective of civil conﬂict over government
9policies (within a uniﬁed country) may induce the "center" itself to prefer a
country breakup.
In summary, recent research on the political economy of national borders
points to the following conclusions:
(1) Large national unions come with substantial costs as well as beneﬁts.
(2) Democratization, globalization and reduction in international conﬂict are
associated with the formation of smaller countries.
(3) Up to a point, the breakup of countries can be eﬃcient and welfare-
improving.
(4) However, these trends may also lead to ineﬃcient fragmentation and
costly civil conﬂict, in the absence of appropriate mechanisms for compensation
of regions and groups that are far from the central government in terms of
preferences over public policies.
These considerations raise two related questions. First, what kind of com-
pensation and redistribution across regions could ensure eﬃcient and stable
borders? Second, would direct decentralization of power reduce the incentives
for breakup and conﬂict? We will discuss these two issues in the rest of the
chapter.
103 Interregional redistribution as a double-edged
sword
As we have mentioned in the previous section, ineﬃcient breakups and secessions
may occur when borders are determined democratically. Voters with preferences
that are “far” from the central government bear higher heterogeneity costs from
living in a larger, more diverse country, and may decide to form a smaller,
more homogenous political unit when they perceive that such heterogeneity
costs are higher than the scale economies associated with a larger size. Such
breakups may lead to a lower sum of everybody’s utilities (ineﬃciency), so
that, in principle, everybody could be better oﬀ in a uniﬁed country, given
appropriate transfers from the center to the periphery. Ineﬃcient outcomes
occur under the assumption that there is no redistribution of resources across
regions: all citizens contribute equally to the public good, independently of their
location. An important question is whether actual interregional redistribution of
resources may change the voters’ calculation and aﬀect the stability of national
borders. The response depends on a crucial distinction between two kinds of
interregional transfers: (1) preference-based transfers, and (2) income-based
transfers. Preference-based transfers are payments to regions that are “distant”
from the central government in terms of preferences over public policies. In
contrast, income-based transfers are redistributive transfers from richer regions
to poorer regions, based on income diﬀerences. These two diﬀerent kinds of
transfers have very diﬀerent properties and eﬀects on border stability. We will
11examine them in order.
3.1 Preference-based transfers and country stability
Conceptually, preference-based transfers can be viewed as "side payments" to
regions that are distant from the central government in terms of preferences
over public policies. In principle, as we have already mentioned, such transfers
could compensate regions that would otherwise secede, and therefore ensure ef-
ﬁciency and stability.5 The theoretical rationale is straightforward: if a country
breakup is ineﬃcient, it means that the sum of everybody’s utilities is lower
after a breakup. Then, one could transfer resources from those who would lose
from a breakup (people “close” to the central government) to those who would
beneﬁt from a breakup (people “far” from the central government) such that,
after the transfers, everybody (or at least a large enough majority) would be
better oﬀ in the uniﬁed country, and therefore unity (with transfers) would be
preferred over a breakup in a democratic equilibrium. In theoretical contribu-
tions, transfer schemes as means to prevent secessions and implement eﬃcient
borders have been studied by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003), Le Breton and
Weber (2003), Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2005), and others. For exam-
ple, Le Breton and Weber (2003) explore the case in which a nonlinear transfer
scheme can prevent unilateral secessions in a country of optimal size. In the
case of linear utility from consumption, an eﬃcient solution could be achieved
by majority voting if taxes could be set according to a full-compensation for-
12mula, according to which individuals who are far from the government pay lower
taxes as compensation for the heterogeneity costs they suﬀer. In principle, by
appropriately lowering the taxes of individuals in proportion to the political
costs they bear, the government can ensure that all voters end up with identical
utility levels. However, are preference-based preferences observed in practice,
and do they work?
There is some anecdotal evidence that border regions with diﬀerent prefer-
ences and ethnic/linguistic/cultural characteristics from the rest of a country
sometime receive a relatively favorable ﬁscal treatment. These cases include
special-status regions in Italy, Northern regions in Sweden, some provinces of
Canada and Argentina, etc. However, in general pure preference-based transfers
seem to be relatively rare. There are several reasons why, in practice, preference-
based redistribution across regions is unlikely to be widespread: (a) feasibility
and administrative costs; (b) political credibility; and (c) incompatibility with
other social goals. We will brieﬂy discuss each of these issues separately.
Preference-based transfers may be very expensive to implement because of
administrative costs and distortions. The preferences on which those transfers
must be based are deﬁned in terms of individuals’ utility or disutility from be-
l o n g i n gt oc o u n t r i e sw i t hd i ﬀerent characteristics — including cultural, linguistic
and religious characteristics. Consequently, a large part of those costs and ben-
eﬁts are non-pecuniary, and very hard to observe and measure objectively. And
even if those heterogeneity costs could be perfectly observed or ‘revealed,’ re-
distributive schemes to compensate for them are likely to require an expensive
13administrative setup, implying high taxes and tax distortions (disincentives to
work, save and invest). In summary, preference-based transfers may be either
unfeasible or economically costly.
Even if one abstracts from issues of feasibility and administrative costs, the
implementation of preference-based transfers may face a more subtle obstacle:
political credibility. Suppose that a region is enticed to remain within a larger
country with the promise of a more favorable tax treatment. Once the re-
gion has accepted to remain within the country, the central government can
break its promises. Borders are hard to change, whereas taxes and transfers
can be changed more often and more easily. Consequently, regions that ac-
cept to be part of a given country face the risk that tax and transfer policies
may be changed in the future, when the option of secession is no longer avail-
able, or available only at a much higher cost. In other words, for preference-
based transfers to be politically credible, the threat of secession must be persis-
tent and credible. Alternatively, preference-based transfers must be backed by
some other credible “commitment technology” - for example, an international
treaty protecting the country’s minority. An example of international guaran-
tee for a minority region is the 1971 treaty between Italy and Austria about
the German-speaking Italian province of Bozen/Bolzano, following serious sep-
aratist disturbances (including some acts of terrorism) in the 1960s. The 1971
treaty stipulated that the province of Bozen/Bolzano should receive greater au-
tonomy within Italy, including signiﬁcant ﬁscal autonomy, and that disputes in
the province would be submitted for settlement to the International Court of
14Justice in The Hague.
Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2005) show that even in the absence of an
appropriate commitment technology, linear transfer schemes can be supported
by a majority of the population in polarized societies in which the median
distance from the government is higher than the average distance. However, even
in this case, there is no assurance that the feasible redistributive mechanism will
enforce eﬃcient borders. In some circumstances, preference-based redistribution
decided by majority voting will even imply excessive transfers to the periphery,
and induce the center to secede!
Finally, even if preference-based transfers were perfectly feasible and credi-
ble, they might still face political obstacles because they may clash with other
social and political objectives. Since preference-based transfers, by deﬁnition,
abstract from income diﬀerences, they may imply substantial transfers of re-
sources from poorer to richer regions and individuals. This may conﬂict with
goals of “interpersonal equity” or other social objectives and constraints, there-
fore making a preference-based redistributive scheme diﬃcult to implement po-
litically.
3.2 Income-based transfers
In contrast to preference-based transfers, income-based transfers are widespread
and much easier to implement and maintain economically and politically. How-
ever, their eﬃciency properties and eﬀects on country stability are quite diﬀerent
15from those of preference-based transfers.
Unlike preference-based transfers, income-based transfers are much more
likely to play a “centrifugal” role, by adding to the costs from interregional
political heterogeneity (diﬀerent political preferences over public policies) when
there is substantial income inequality across regions. Income-based interregional
transfers can help keep poorer regions “in” if their political heterogeneity is not
too high. That is, income-based transfers from the center to the periphery might
accidentally operate as a compensation mechanism and help keep some regions
within a country. However, in general these transfers will not ensure optimality
or stability of borders, since there is no guarantee that poorer regions would
be those farther from the central government in terms of preferences for public
policies and types of government. On the contrary, it is at least as likely that
income-based redistribution would add to heterogeneity costs within a country,
by generating an additional source of political conﬂict across regions, and pro-
viding additional incentives for richer regions to secede. In fact, even in the
absence of any other form of preference heterogeneity, interregional disagree-
ments over income-based redistribution may be suﬃcient to induce country
breakup. For example, in their pioneer analysis of the relationship between
income-based transfers and country stability, Bolton and Roland (1997) studied
a model of country breakup by majority vote when individuals diﬀer in pro-
ductivity and income, but not in preferences over types of governments. In
Bolton and Roland’s model diﬀerences in income distributions across region are
at the roots of all diﬀerences in preferences over public policies, and may gener-
16ate incentives to break up, even in the absence of other forms of heterogeneity.
More generally, as shown in this literature (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Alesina
and Spolaore, 2003, chapter 4), income-based redistribution has three eﬀects
on the incentives to secede in a given region: (i) a political eﬀect, capturing
the diﬀerence in desired ﬁscal policy between the region’s median voter and the
median voter in a uniﬁed country; (ii) a tax-base eﬀect, capturing the diﬀerence
between average income in the region and in the uniﬁed country, and (iii) an
"eﬃciency/economies of scale" eﬀect, capturing a reduction in average income
because of country breakup (for example, because of a smaller extent of the
market when there are barriers to trade across nations, consistently with the re-
sults about international openness mentioned in Section 2). Unless the regional
median voter shares identical preferences with the national median voter (which
is unlikely), the political eﬀect is always centrifugal: any region would prefer to
breakup and implement its own favored ﬁscal policy, other things being equal.
In contrast, the tax-base eﬀect is centrifugal for richer regions (which, therefore,
are more likely to prefer separation, other things being equal), and centripetal
for poorer regions, which beneﬁt on average from income-based redistribution.
Finally, the economies-of-scale eﬀect is centripetal for all regions - that is, it
reduces the incentives to breakup. Consequently, when the economies-of-scale
eﬀect is small (say, because of high international openness and/or a reduction in
the economies of scale associated with the provision of defense), richer regions
become much more likely to prefer separation, given eﬀects (i) and (ii), and even
poorer regions may prefer separation, when eﬀect (i) dominates eﬀect (ii). The
17bottom line is that, on balance, income-based redistribution is likely to play a
centrifugal role - i.e., to reduce the stability of national borders.
In conclusion, the relationship between redistribution and country stability
can be summarized as follows:
(a) In principle, well-designed interregional transfers could ensure country
stability, but they would have to compensate regions with more heterogeneous
preferences with respect to the central government, rather than be based on
income diﬀerences.
(b) In practice, such “eﬃcient” compensation schemes based on preferences
are diﬃcult to implement both economically and politically.
(c) In contrast, most interregional redistribution is based on income dif-
ferences across regions, and such income-based transfers are likely to play a
centrifugal role when incomes diﬀer substantially across regions.
(d) Consequently, actual interregional redistribution is likely to be destabi-
lizing.
As follows from our discussion in Section 2, an important point to stress is
that the (centrifugal) eﬀects of interregional redistribution on country stability
depend on how centralized political power is within the country. The higher
the degree of political centralization, the higher the heterogeneity costs for the
periphery, and therefore the higher the pressure to compensate regions with
diverse preferences, and the larger the centrifugal eﬀects when those transfers
fail to work, or even end up adding to the heterogeneity costs. This raises a
key question: since compensations and transfers are unlikely to work as eﬃcient
18side payments, can country stability be enhanced by a direct transfer of power
from the center to the periphery? What if central governments attempt to keep
regions together using not only interregional transfers but also direct decentral-
ization of public functions, including federal power-sharing? This will be the
subject of the next section.
4 Do decentralization and federalism promote
country stability?
If the incentives to secede depend on the political costs from belonging to a
larger, more heterogeneous country, more power to the periphery can reduce
the periphery’s heterogeneity costs from staying in a union, and hence the net
beneﬁts from secession. Therefore, decentralization and regional autonomy, in
principle, can promote country stability - in other words, decentralization can
have centripetal eﬀects. This is the more intuitive eﬀect of decentralization, and
has received considerable attention in the politico-economic literature. How-
ever, a few commentators have pointed out to possible centrifugal eﬀects from
decentralization as well, if more power to the periphery also increases local gov-
ernments’ capabilities and resources, therefore enhancing their ability to secede.
In a nutshell, decentralization may reduce a peripheral region’s willingness to
secede while increasing its ability, with ambiguous net eﬀects.
In this Section we will brieﬂy review a few arguments in favor and against
19the stabilizing role of decentralization and federalism. We will then present a
simple analytical model that captures those opposite eﬀects. Finally, we will
discuss some recent empirical contributions that shed some light on this complex
issue.
4.1 Federalism and decentralization: centripetal or cen-
trifugal forces?
The idea of decentralization and federalism as a way to preserve diversity in a
democracy has a long pedigree. For example, in 1764 Cesare Beccaria wrote:
To the extent that society increases, each member becomes a
smaller part of the whole, and the republican sentiment becomes
proportionally smaller, if the laws do not take care to reinforce it.
Societies, like human bodies, have their circumscribed limits, and
if they grow beyond them their economy is necessarily disturbed.
The size of a state must necessarily be inversely proportional to the
sensitivity [‘sensibilità’] of those who comprise it ... A republic that
is too vast cannot save itself from despotism except by subdividing
itself and uniting itself into so many federative republics.
Similar ideas about the role and limits of federalism in reducing the risks of
instability and despotism (including a possible "tyranny of the majority") can
be found in the exchanges between Federalists and Anti-federalists in eighteenth-
century America.
20More recently, a number of political scientists have emphasized the positive
eﬀects of federalism on country stability. As Bakke and Wibbels (200) summa-
rize "The theoretical justiﬁcation for federalism, or decentralization, is based
on the combination of shared rule and self-rule: federalism oﬀers the poten-
tial to retain the territorial integrity of the state while providing some for of
self-governance for disaﬀected groups." The beneﬁts of regional autonomy as a
“power-sharing approach” are emphasized by Lijphart (1990), while the posi-
tive eﬀects of checks on the central government associated with federalism are
stressed by Weingast (1995) and others. More recent work emphasizing the
"peace preserving" nature of federalism includes Bermeo (2002), who argues
that federal states tend to do better than unitary states when accommodat-
ing ethnic conﬂict and minority discrimination.6 Commentators who stress the
beneﬁts of federative arrangements for diverse, multiethnic societies also rely
on case studies of "successful" federations, such as Switzerland and, to some
extent, Canada, India and South Africa.7
However, less successful cases of federations and attempts to decentralization
have provided counterarguments against federalism as a stabilizing force. For
example, the Civil War in the United States has been viewed by many as an
instance when federal decentralization provided the means and mechanisms for
a costly attempt to secede. Power decentralization and federal arrangements are
also "blamed" by some for the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia.8 Criticisms of the costs of ﬁscal federalism and decentralization in
Argentina are provided by Saiegh and Tommasi (1999) and Spiller and Tommasi
21(2003). A particularly extreme case of "centrifugal" and destabilizing eﬀect of
decentralization is associated with the creation of a safe haven for guerrilla
rebels (FARC) in Colombia in the late 1990s. Criticism of decentralization as
a destabilizing force leading to civil conﬂict has also been aired with respect to
recent reforms in a few African countries (for example, Nigeria).
In sum, the political and historical literature is mixed. A majority of com-
mentators views federalism and decentralization as stabilizing forces, but some
critics stress counterexamples in which decentralization seems to be associated
with increasing country instability.
Below we provide a simple analytical model that clariﬁes conceptually the
interplay between centrifugal and centripetal eﬀects of decentralization and fed-
eralism. Empirical contributions are brieﬂy discussed at the end of this section.
4.2 A simple model of decentralization and country sta-
bility
Consider a country in which the government provides a continuum of public
goods, indexed from 0 to 1.9 Some public goods are provided by the central
government, while some others are provided by the periphery’s own local gov-
ernment. The periphery’s citizens obtain net utility equal to g from each public
good provided locally, while the net utility from a centrally-provided public
good is equal to g−h+k,w h e r eh measures heterogeneity costs associated with
22central provision of the public good, and k captures net economies of scale from
central provision.10 S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h es t u d yo fp o t e n t i a ls e c e s s i o n s ,
we focus on the case when heterogeneity costs are higher than economies of scale
(h>k ), and therefore the periphery would prefer decentralized provision of all
public goods (i.e., full independence). Let δ measure the proportion of locally
provided public goods - that is, the degree of decentralization. In general, for a
given degree of decentralization δ, the periphery’s utility from public goods is
given by
Uδ = δg +( 1− δ)(g − h + k) (1)
which is maximized at δ =1and Uδ=1 = g (full independence). Now, assume
that the periphery can choose whether to attempt a secession or remain within
the uniﬁed state. If the periphery does not attempt a secession, its citizens’
utility is given by Uδ. If the periphery attempts a secession, two outcomes are
possible. With probability π the secession is successful, the periphery gains
full independence, and utility from public goods becomes Uδ=1 = g.W i t h
probability 1 − π the secession fails, and the periphery ends up with a lower
utility Uf <U δ.11 To ﬁxi d e a s ,l e tC denote the cost from a failed secession, so
that12
Uf = Uδ − C (2)
23The periphery obtains higher expected utility from attempting a secession than
from the status quo if and only if
πg +( 1− π)(Uδ − C) >U δ (3)




(1 − δ)(h − k) >C (4)
where the left-hand side of the above inequality measures the "incentives for the
periphery to secede," which we denote with S. When the incentives to secede
S are higher than the cost from a failed secession C, the periphery will attempt
secession. Not surprisingly, the incentives to secede S are increasing in the
heterogeneity costs h and decreasing in the economies of scale k,c o n s i s t e n t l y
with the theory of national borders reviewed in Section 2. But what about
decentralization? The above equation shows that, for given π,ah i g h e rd e -
gree of decentralization δ reduces the incentives to secede. This is the intuitive,
direct eﬀect of decentralization on the incentives to secede: by decentralizing
the supply of public goods, the central government can reduce the extent of
heterogeneity costs from centralized public-good provision, and hence lower the
incentives for the periphery to breakup. However, as we discussed above, decen-
tralization may indirectly aﬀect the probability that the secession may succeed,
if attempted - that is, π might be itself an (increasing) endogenous function
of δ. In order to illustrate this point more speciﬁcally, let’s assume that π can
24be expressed in terms of a "contest success function," increasing in the periph-
ery’s capabilities Fp (i.e.,inputs that can be used in conﬂict), and decreasing
in the center’s capabilities Fc.T h a t i s , w e h a v e π = π(Fp,F c). To ﬁxi d e a s
(and simplify the algebra), consider for instance a logistic speciﬁcation in which
the odds of success for the periphery depend on the diﬀerence between its own




=e x p {φ(Fp − Fc)} (5)
where the parameter φ captures the "eﬀectiveness" of conﬂict inputs. It is rea-
sonable to assume that decentralization will increase the periphery’s resources
in case of conﬂict, and reduce the center’s. Speciﬁcally, assume that, in addition
to some exogenous additional resources Fc0 and Fp0, center and periphery can
access some common pool of resources R, in proportion to the fraction of public




=e x p {φ[Fp0 − Fc0 − (1 − 2δ)R]} (6)
implying that an increase in decentralization δ will be associated with higher
odds of success for a secession, and henceforth a larger S, other things being
equal.
In other words, this indirect eﬀect of δ on π increases the incentives to secede,
and can oﬀset the direct eﬀect of δ on S. In general, by substituting (6) into






(h − k)[2φR(1 − δ) − 1] (7)




if an only if 2φR(1 − δ) − 1 < 0, or, equivalently, if and only if decentralization







In other words: more decentralization will reduce the incentives to secede if and
only if decentralization is high enough (δ>δ
∗). In contrast, at low levels of
decentralization (that is, when δ<δ
∗), more decentralization will increase the
incentives to breakup. The critical value depends on the parameter φ,w h i c h
measures the eﬀectiveness of "conﬂict inputs." Not surprisingly, the threshold
above which decentralization has stabilizing eﬀects is higher in societies where
the diﬀerence in capabilities has a bigger eﬀect on the probability of success. On
the other hand, when "force" has less impact on outcomes, decentralization is
more likely to imply more stable polities. This can be interpreted in terms of a
key role for the political and institutional environment where a potential seces-
sion may occur: an increase in decentralization is more likely to have a positive
eﬀect on country stability in societies in which political institutions and societal
characteristics ensure that conﬂict capabilities are less eﬀective at determining
national borders. Moreover, for given eﬀectiveness of capabilities, an increase
26in decentralization is more likely to have a stabilizing eﬀect in societies that are
already highly decentralized, whereas it may have a centrifugal eﬀect in more
centralized societies.15
While the speciﬁcs of these results depend on highly simplifying assumptions
and functional forms, the message of the analysis is quite general: the eﬀects of
decentralization on country stability are analytically ambiguous because decen-
tralization has two opposite eﬀects: it reduces the net payoﬀ from a secession,
but, on the other hand, it may increase the probability of success should a se-
cession be attempted. In general, the net outcome will depend on the complex
interplay of those diﬀerent forces, and it is possible that, especially at low levels
of decentralization, the destabilizing eﬀect may dominate the stabilizing eﬀect,
with the critical threshold depending on the political-institutional setting in
which conﬂict takes place.
4.3 Federalism and country stability: what do the data
say?
As our highly simpliﬁed model illustrates, the eﬀects of decentralization on
country stability are ambiguous. In general, the relationship between decen-
tralization and country stability may go either way, depending on the interplay
between centripetal and centrifugal eﬀects in diﬀerent societal, political and in-
stitutional environments. This makes it even more urgent to study these issues
from an historical and empirical perspective. What do the data say? Are more
27decentralized countries and federations more or less stable? Unfortunately these
are not easy questions to address empirically, because of several practical and
conceptual issues that arise when we attempt to measure the relevant variables
and interpret their links.
A ﬁrst problem is how to deﬁne and measure decentralization. As Bird (1993)
notices, “decentralization seems often to mean whatever the person using the
t e r mw a n t si tt om e a n . ”D i ﬀerent studies use a vast range of deﬁnitions and
measures for decentralization, devolution, and degree of federalism. Secondly,
it is even harder to come up with good measures of “country stability.” Actual
breakups and secessions, while not infrequent, are relatively rare. Moreover, se-
cessions per se do not necessarily reﬂect an institutional failure, if the redrawing
of borders is peaceful, consensual and eﬃciency-enhancing. Measures of "nega-
tive" outcomes (armed conﬂict, rebellions, protests) associated with ethnic and
civil conﬂict may capture more directly some of the costs usually associated with
border instability. More generally, as we have seen, the ability to mediate con-
ﬂict within countries and to reduce potential heterogeneity costs is associated
with the general eﬀectiveness of political institutions, which can be measured
in terms of orderly transfer of power, protection of political rights, etc.
Even if decentralization and country stability were to be measured appropri-
ately and unambiguously, a third issue would be how to identify causality. For
example, a positive correlation between having a more decentralized regime and
observing ethnic conﬂict would not demonstrate that decentralization causes
ethnic conﬂict, or vice versa. In fact, consistently with a political-economy ap-
28proach to national borders, more heterogenous societies are likely to be more
decentralized (because of higher demand for autonomy) and also more prone
to ethnic conﬂict (because of higher heterogeneity and higher demand for addi-
tional sovereignty), without a necessary causal link going directly from decen-
tralization to ethnic conﬂict. Historically, while several countries that eventu-
ally broke up were indeed federations (e.g. the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia),
did they break up because they were federations, or were they shaped as fed-
eral systems because they were formed by heterogeneous regions and groups
to start with? Given the endogeneity of the institutional system and the com-
plexity of circumstances associated with successful or unsuccessful secessions
and breakups, it is intrinsically diﬃcult to disentangle the causal links between
decentralization and the stability of federations.
A very interesting attempt to assess the relation between decentralization
and ethnic conﬂict is provided by Bakke and Wibbels (2006), who focus on
diﬀerences across federal states. Intriguingly, they ﬁnd that ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion increases the likelihood of ethnic conﬂict when there are wide disparities
in income across regions. This is consistent with the view that heterogeneity of
preferences and diﬀerences in income interact as sources of potential country in-
stability, and may oﬀset the beneﬁcial eﬀects of decentralization. However, these
results do not imply that governments faced with high ethnic heterogeneity and
economic inequality across regions should move away from decentralization and
federalism. On the contrary, the positive correlation between decentralization
and ethnic conﬂict in the presence of income inequality may reﬂect the fact that
29economically diverse federations prone to ethnic conﬂict may indeed need more
decentralization, the same way that individuals prone to disease need and use
more doctors and medicine. Taking decentralization away from those countries
may be as unwise as taking doctors and medicine away from patients because
those variables (medicines and doctors) are usually observed in conjunction with
sick people and disease!
A recent empirical analysis of the eﬀects of federalism that attempts to con-
trol for endogeneity is provided in Inman (2008). In this study Inman compares
73 federal and non-federal countries, and ﬁnds positive economic and politi-
cal eﬀects of federalism in democracies, but not in dictatorships. The positive
eﬀects of federalism include more orderly transfer of executive power, better
protection of civil and political rights, and less corruption (see also Fisman and
Gatti, 2002). Inman attempts to address the issue of endogeneity and causality
by using instrumental variables (country land area, number of provinces, and
provincial representation to the central government), and by limiting the sample
to countries whose current constitutions were established before 1950. As one
may expect, it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate instruments that are both
exogenous and aﬀect the dependent variables (in this case, various measures of
political and economic performance) only through federalism. One may indeed
take issue with the validity of those instruments - for instance, the number of
provinces itself is probably endogenous, and one could argue that the character-
istics that determined which countries adopted federal constitutions before 1950
may also aﬀect political and economic outcomes of interest today. Nonetheless,
30I n m a n ’ sa n a l y s i si sav a l u a b l eﬁrst step towards assessing the causal eﬀects of
federalism on important political and economic variables, and sheds insight on
the positive correlation between democratic federalism and a range of important
outcomes. However, a comprehensive empirical analysis of the eﬀects of feder-
alism and decentralization on the stability of states and federations remains an
important task for future research.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this chapter we have reviewed some ideas and results from the recent economic
literature on the formation and breakup of sovereign states. We have shown how
the political-economic analysis of national borders points to a potentially sta-
bilizing role for interregional redistribution and decentralization. However, we
have also discussed several reasons why, in practice, we should be skeptical about
the extent to which interregional transfers can actually reduce regional conﬂict
and potential separatism, especially when there are large “heterogeneity costs”
across regions, because of cultural, linguistic and/or economic diﬀerences. In
fact, actual income—based regional redistribution, especially when interacting
with ethnic and cultural diversity, is likely to increase interregional conﬂict and
s e p a r a t i s m .W eh a v ea l s oa r g u e dt h a tf e d eralism and decentralization raise the
periphery’s beneﬁts from political union, but also its ability to secede, with am-
biguous eﬀects on country stability. Empirically, decentralization within federal
states is associated with more ethnic conﬂict when economic inequality is high
31across regions. However, the evidence also suggests an overall positive eﬀect
of federalism and decentralization on political and economic outcomes, when
accompanied by strong democratic institutions.
Notes
1For instance, according to Dillinger (1994), 63 out of 75 developing countries with popu-
lation greater than 5 million claimed to be transferring ﬁscal authority from central to local
governments.
2For example, see the references in Dahl and Tufte (1973).
3See Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 10).
4See Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000; 2004) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005).
5See Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 4) and Le Breton and Weber (2003).
6S e ea l s oL a k ea n dO ’ M a h o n y( 2 0 0 4 ) .
7For instance, see Inman and Rubinfeld’s (2006) analysis of democratic federalism in South
Africa. I thank the discussant, Massimo Bordignon, for this reference.
8For example, see Roeder (1991) and Suny (1993).
9For simplicity we abstract from the level of provision, and assume that all public goods
are provided in ﬁxed amounts.
10For simplicity, here we assume that the parameters g, h and k are identical across all
public goods. The model could be extended to allow for diﬀerent public goods to provide
diﬀerent net utilities in terms of beneﬁts, heterogeneity costs and economies of scale, as in
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 2)..
11If Uf ≥ Uδ, the periphery would have nothing to lose should the secession fail, and would
always attempt to secede, no matter how small π.
12For simplicity, we assume that C is exogenous and does not depend on δ.The model could
be extended to allow for C to depend on δ (for example, if a failed secession were to bring
about a reduction in the degree of decentralization, compared to the status quo ante).
3213This speciﬁcation, discussed in Hirshleifer (1989), is commonly used in the economic










. For a discussion of alternative speciﬁcations to model separatist conﬂict
see Spolaore (2008).
14For simplicity, we assume that Fc0 and Fp0 are exogenous. However, in general the center
and the periphery might invest resources to increase their capabilities (as in Spolaore, 2008),
in addition to the resources that come from control of public-good provision. Such extension
is left for further research.
15Of course this is under the assumption that the degree of decentralization δ is given. An
interesting extension would involve endogenizing δ, either as a decision of the center, or as the
outcome of a political game between the center and the periphery. Even in that more complex
setting, we should expect that decisions regarding δ would be aﬀected by the balance between
decentralization’s centrifugal and centripetal eﬀects.
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